THE ENGLISH PRIVATE COMPANY
L. C. B. Gow R
Since 1908 the expression "Private Company" has been a term of art with a
precise statutory definition. This definition, however, was merely the culmination
of a long historical development and it is perhaps advisable to commence this short
account of an immensely important branch of English Company Law by a brief
summary of its historical background.'
Until I 8 44 there were no arrangements in England for speedy and cheap incorporation. The boon of corporate entity could only be obtained by a special Act
of Parliament or by obtaining a charter from the Crown and neither was readily
procurable. Hence business men and their advisers had tried to mould the unincorporated partnership into a form which would provide most of the advantages of
corporate personality without a formal grant of incorporation. Thanks to the
ubiquitous trust concept their efforts met with considerable success and produced a
form of joint stock company organized under a Deed of Settlement which vested
the property of the concern in Trustees, divided it into transferable shares, and
entrusted its management to directors who would normally be the same as the
trustees.
The unincorporated Deed of Settlement Company was subject to three main
disadvantages, all flowing from the fact that in the eyes of the law it was merely a
partnership although often swollen to a size which destroyed any possibility of the
mutual confidence between the members which was supposed to be at the root of
partnership law: (i) The members were personally liable for the obligations of the
firm without limitation of liability; (2) the gravest procedural difficulties arose when
the company was suing or being sued or when execution was being levied on its
property or that of its members; and (3) it was doubtful whether even express provision in the Deed of Settlement could effectively provide for complete freedom of
transferability of shares. While the Bubble Act' remained in force, the better view
was that some limitation on transfers was essential,' and even after the Act was
repealed in 1825' doubts still remained.5 Hence share transfers were normally
* Sir Ernest Cassel Professor of Commercial Law, University of London.

'The best accounts of the most important periods are A. B. Dusos, THE ENGLISH BUsINEsS COmPANY
AFTER TE BUBBLE AcT, 1720-1800 (1938); B. C. HUNT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BusNpSS CORPORATIoN IN ENGLAND, 1800-x867 (1936). For a recent short account of the whole development, see C. A.
COOKE, CouoRtmIoN, TRUsT AND COMPANY (1950).
26 GEo. I, c. 18 (720).

' This was the view taken by professional opinion immediately after the passing of the prolix and
obscure Act (see DUBOIs, op, cit. supra note i, at 3 Ct seq.) and is supported by the nineteenth century
decisions of which there is a good account in HuTr, op. cit. supra note i, at cc. II and IlI.
' By 6 GEo. IV, c. 91.
'They were only finally eradicated in 1843: Garrard v. Hardey, 5 Man. & G. 471, 134 Eng. Rep.
648 (C. P. 1843); and Harrison v. Heathorn, 6 Man. & G. 81, 134 Eng. Rep. 817 (C. P. 1843).
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subject to express restriction and this, coupled with the fact that shares entailing unlimited liability were not readily marketable, tended at first to restrict the use
of unincorporated Deed of Settlement Companies to groups of business men with
common interests. Having regard to this, it is interesting to note that, already in the
eighteenth century, the term "private company" was in use to distinguish such concerns from public companies incorporated by charter or statute.
During the early nineteenth century, however, there was an enormous growth
of company promotions, genuine and fraudulent,' and methods of evading the members' legal liability were developed. The chaotic state of the law forced the legislature
to intervene, at first hesitantly," but under the influence of Gladstone, then President of the Board of Trade, more boldly in the first great Companies Act of I844. 0
This Act enabled companies to become incorporated by registering their Deeds of
Settlement with the Board of Trade" ° and, for the first time, attempted to draw a
clear-cut distinction between companies and partnerships by providing that associations of more than 25 persons (reduced to the present 20 in i856) should be unlawful
unless registered under the Act or formed under charter or statute. This Act, however, denied one of the most sought after consequences of incorporation-freedom
from personal liability; its object was to regulate, not to encourage, speculation.
Eleven years later, however, after lengthy and heated controversy in Parliament,
Royal Commissions, Departmental Committees, the Press, and, indeed in every forum
of public and commercial opinion, Parliament under pressure from the Government
of the day passed the Limited Liability Act, 1855,"l conferring limited liability on
companies which completed registration under the 1844 Act. The method of limitation was the same as that adopted by statutory companies which already enjoyed that
advantage; namely, the members were liable only to the extent of the unpaid liability
12
on their shares which had to be given a fixed nominal value.
The 1855 Act remained in existence only a few months when it and the 1844
Act, together with various intervening, amending and winding-up Acts, were
repealed and consolidated in the Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856.3 This swept
6

Cf. the Statute of 1767 (7 GEo. ll, c. 48) in which "public company" is used in the latter sense.

,A popular account of the modus operandi is Dickens' description of the "Anglo-Bengalec Disinterested Loan and Life Assurance Company" in MARTIN CotzzLEwn' (1848).
°The Trading Companies Act, 1834 (4 & 5 W7. IV, c. 94) and the Chartered Companies Act, 1837
(I Vscr., c. 73) enabled the Crown by letters patent to confer any of the privileges of incorporation
without a formal charter of incorporation. Little use was made of this power since the law officers
and the Board of Trade were still imbued with the feeling of reluctance officially to recognize joint
stock companies which had prevailed ever since the South Sea bubble in 1720.
97 & 8 Viar., c. IxO.

The Government Department which is responsible for company legislation, registration, and supervision. It fulfills some of the functions exercised in America by the Securities and Exchange Commission
but with far less extensive powers. In England, in this, as in a surprisingly large number of other
spheres, there is far less state control than in the United States of America.
11 i8 & i9 Vicr., c. 133.
"5 English law still does not recognize no-par-value shares. A bill to legalize them failed to obtain a
1o

second reading (the first stage of debate) when introduced by a private member in x952. In the same
year a Departmental Committee was set up to consider the matter; it has not yet reported.
13 19 & 20 ViCr., c. 47.
This Act for the first time extended registration to Scotland and included
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away most of the safeguards which the 1855 Act had provided, 4 retaining only the
fundamental principle on which the i844 Act had been based-the principle of
publicity. If the liability of the members was to be limited the word "Limited"
had to appear as the last word of the company's name, acting as a red flag warning
the public of the dangers they ran if they dealt with the organization.1 4 This and
the possibility of ascertaining details of the company's structure from inspection of
the public register were thought to afford the public all the protection they deserved.
Laissez faire had triumphed. 5
After this date there were two main legal forms for commercial enterprise in
England: the registered company, incorporated and with limited liability, and the
unincorporated partnership or sole trader whose business was not personified by
incorporation and whose liability was necessarily unlimited. If over 20 persons were
interested in the business an unincorporated partnership was illegal; if the number
of members was over 61' but not more than 20, incorporation was an optional alternative to partnership, but, if the number was less than 7 a partnership was the only
possibility and limited liability was unobtainable.
Hence, or so it was thought, the one demand which had not been met was for a
method of limiting the liability of the members of a small family concern. Registration was thought of primarily as a method of enabling the entrepreneur to obtain
capital from the public. Not, of course, that there was any compulsion on the
company or its promoter to make any general public invitation: the value of registration to smaller and more closely knit concerns was clearly recognized and the name
"private company" became associated with them.P But the 1856 Act had prescribed
a minimum of 7 members for a registered company, thus apparently ruling out the
one-man business or the small family partnership.
The consequence was agitation for the introduction of limited partnerships on
the lines of the Continental socitg en commendite, a form of partnership with both
general and limited partners derived from the cormmenda of Roman law. This had
never taken root in England. Indeed, anything approaching it was ruled out by the
provisions for winding up which previously has been dealt with separately. Banks and insurance
companies were excluded until 1858 (20 & 21 VIr., c. 49 and 21 & 22 Vimr-., c. 9i) and 1862 (25 & 26
Vicm., c. 78) respectively.
"' The 1855 Act had required a minimum issued and paid up capital, personal liability of the directors if they paid a dividend knowing the company to be insolvent, Board of Trade approval of auditors,
and obligatory winding up if three-fourths of the capital was lost.
""The arbitrary exclusion of freedom from liability despite incorporation which had prevailed in the
preceding x2 years made this necessary and accounts for the fact that English companies are still distinguished by "Ltd." instead of the more logical "Inc." used in the United States.
";Parliament had, in effect, accepted the view of Lord Bramwell in the Report of the Mercantile Law
Commision, 27 BITIsH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 445 (854), that "if ever there was a rule established
by reason, authority and experience, it is that the interest of a community is best consulted by leaving
to its members, as far as possible, the unrestricted and unfettered exercise of their own talents and
industry," and that this golden rule demanded the recognition of limited liability provided only that
those seeking to take advantage of it openly announced this in the name under which they traded.
'" The Act prescribed a minimum of 7 members.
"For an early use of this term by the judiciary, see In re British Seamless Paper Box Co., 17 Ch.
D. 467, 478 (s88x), per Cotton, L. J. Palmer first published his Private Companies in x877.
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prevailing idea that any sharing of net profits was conclusive evidence of partnership,"8 an idea which was not finally proved unsound until 186o.o In the meantime
many efforts had been made to do something about it,2" but nothing materialized
until 1865 when the Mercantile Law (Amendment) Act"' (commonly known as
Bovill's Act) provided that lenders, or sellers of goodwill, receiving a share of profits
should not be conclusively presumed to be partners but that they should be deferred
creditors in the event of bankruptcy. At the time it was thought that this had
effected a substantial advance, but in truth it only protected the creditor where he
was not associated in the running of the business, and where, indeed, he had
recently secured protection at common law.
When this was realized there was a renewed outbreak of attempts to legalize
full-fledged limited partnerships on the Continental model and it was from one such
abortive attempt that the Partnership Act, i89o, s resulted, although this, in its
final form, merely codified the existing law. In reality, however, the agitation was
misconceived, for the existing companies' legislation enabled all the advantages of
limited partnerships, and more besides, to be obtained at very little price. This first
became plain in the epoch-making case of Salomon v. Salomon24 which reached the
House of Lords in 1897. In 1892 Salomon, being then fully solvent, had promoted
a company to acquire his business which he sold to the company for a large sum
satisfied mainly in shares and debentures. He held all the shares except six, each
of which was registered in the name of a member of his family apparently as a
nominee for him. Within a year the company fell a victim of a trade recession
and its assets were merely sufficient to discharge the debentures,2" nothing being left
for the unsecured creditors. In these circumstances Vaughan Williams, J., and a
strong Court of Appeal held that the company was a mere sham-an alias, agent,
trustee, or nominee-for Salomon who remained the real proprietor of the business
and who was accordingly liable to indemnify the company against its debts. But
the House of Lords unanimously overruled this decision. They held that the company had been validly formed, since the Companies Acts merely required seven
members holding at least one share each and said nothing about their being independent, or that they should take a substantial interest in the undertaking, or that
they should have a mind and will of their own, or that there should be anything
Grace v. Smith, 2 Win. B1. 998, 96 Eng. Rep. 587 (K.B. 1775).
the leading case of Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. 268, I Eng. Rep. 413 (H. L. i86o).
"°Limited partnerships had been advocated by John Austin as early as 1825 (see PARLIAMENTARY
HisrOrY AND REvIEw 711 (1825)) and the Board of Trade obtained a report thereon from Bellenden
Ker in 1837. 44 B~rrSH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERs 399 (1837).
21 28 & 29 Vscr., c. 86. This was an amended version of the bill originally introduced at the same
time as the Limited Liability Act, 1855.
2
" Syers v. Syers, r App. Cas. 174 (1876); Pooley v. Driver, 5 Ch. D. 458 (1876).
2 See the account by its draftsman, Sir Frederick Pollock, in the preface to the twelfth edition of his
Law of Partnership (this preface is reprinted in the current fifteenth edition).
2' [z896] A. C. 22.
' In fairness to the much maligned Mr. Salomon it should be said that he was no longer the holder
(he having sold the debentures and used the money to try to support the tottering company) but the
result would have been the same if he had been.
'n
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like a true balance of power in the constitution of the company. Hence the business
belonged to the company and not to Salomon, and Salomon was its agent not vice
versa. As the transfer to the company had not been in fraud of creditors it could
not be set aside and Salomon was fully protected from liability for the company's
debts.
This decision opened up new vistas to company lawyers and the woild of commerce. It established the legality of the "one man" company and showed that incorporation was as readily available to the small private partnership and sole trader
as to the large public company. It also revealed that it was possible for a trader not
merely to limit his liability to the money which he put into the enterprise but even
to avoid any serious risk to the major part of that by taking debentures and thus
becoming a secured creditor. Laissez faire had triumphed to an extent which might
have shocked its arch-apostle, Lord Bramwell.28 Indeed, the decision did more, for
it established the "corporate entity" principle in a particularly rigorous form and
largely stultified all efforts by the courts to "lift the veil"--so much so that lifting
the veil, that popular subject of academic discussion in the United States, is almost
totally ignored in the English literature, and where the veil has been rent it is
generally the result of express statutory enactment, for normally it is only the
legislature which "can forge a sledge-hammer capable of cracking open the corporate
shell."'2 7 This however is another story; to one aspect of it, germane to our present
subject, we shall have to revert later.
By the beginning of the present century, therefore, the wheel had turned full
circle. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries joint stock enterprises had
pressed into service the legal forms of partnership; now the compliment had been
returned and the joint stock forms had come to annex the proper functions of the
law of partnership.28 Far from discouraging this development the legislature proceeded to relieve the incorporated partnership from some of the normal requirements
of the Companies Acts. The Act of I9oo, - in introducing various new formalities,
exempted from a number of them "a company which does not issue any invitation
to the public."30 But it was by the 1907 Act, 3' embodied in the new Companies
(Consolidation) Act, i 9o8,3Z that private companies were first given a statutory
definition and clearly distinguished from othersY3
2' See note 15, supra. But as late as 1888 Bramwell was boasting of his part in introducing the
legislation which made it possible; see his speech, The Law of Limited Liability, 9 J. INSTITUTE OF
BANKERs 373 et seq. (1888).
" Per Devlin, J., in Bank Voor Handel en Scheepvaart v. Slatford, [1951] 2 All E. R. 779, 799.
28 Cf. 0. Kahn-Freund in his notes to RENNER, THkE INSaaTrioNs OF PRIVATF LAW 331-332 (1945).

Indeed, a similar development had taken place in the law of trusts, for the corporate trustee had come to
its aid thus repaying the debt which earlier company law owed to trusts.
" 63 & 64 VICT., c. 48.
"8See §2 and 6 (and note the use of the expression "private company" in the marginal note to
the latter).
8 EDw. 7, c. 69.
7 ED~w. 7, c. 50.
Z These others are commonly designated "public companies" but for this there is no statutory
justification, apart from a casual reference in § I(5)(c); indeed that expression is rarely applied to a
company limited by guarantee.
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Section 121 of the 19o8 Act (now Section 28 of the Companies Act, I94834 ) de-

fined a private company as one which by its articles:
(a) restricts the right to transfer its shares;3" and
(b) limits the number of its members to 50;36 and
(c) prohibits any invitation to the public to subscribe for any shares or debentures
of the company.

The intention of the definition was to embrace small family concerns, but to
exclude others; and on private companies as thus defined, this and later Acts have
successively conferred a growing number of privileges and immunities 7 The most
important of these are:

(a) A private company need have only two members instead of a minimum of
seven,as and one director instead of a minimum of two. 3
(b) It can be formed more simply and therefore more cheaply, for it does not
have to file a prospectus or statement in lieu of prospectus)4 0 and its directors need
not file in the public register written consents to act, or take up qualification shares
prior to appointment.41

(c) It can commence business immediately on registration and does not have to
obtain a "Trading Certificate" granted to a public company only after the Registrar
is satisfied that the various statutory requirements regarding the flotation of its

capital have been complied with.4B Nor does it have to make a detailed report (the
"Statutory Report") to the members on the flotation and to convene a General

Meeting (the "Statutory Meeting") shortly after the date when the Trading Certificate entitles it to commence business.43

(d) It does not have to file in the public register copies of its accounts and thus
make public its financial position.4 4

(e) Loans may be made by the company to its directors-a practice forbidden
in the case of other companies.4
As the result of these provisions the expense of forming a private company may

be astonishingly small,4" and the amount of publicity comparatively slight. Hence
& 12 GEo. 6, c. 38.
There is no statutory provision as to the nature of the restriction. In practice it is usual to give
the directors an unfettered discretion to refuse transfer and this is sometimes coupled with a right of preemption by the existing shareholders.
"Joint holders are treated as one for this purpose (§a8(2)), and the employees and former
employees who became members while they were employed may be added to the 5o (§a8(i)(b)).
Unless otherwise stated, references hereafter to sections are to those of the Companies Act, 1948.
"7 It is unfortunate that the Companies Act nowhere sets out in one place which of its rules do not
apply to private companies; this has to be culled laboriously from the Act as a whole. There are certain
other differences in addition to the immunities mentioned in the text; for example a proxy can speak,
as well as vote, at a meeting of a private company (§36).
"Sec. s.
"'Sec. 176. The directors can also be appointed more informally (§183(r)).
And provisions relating to retirement on attaining the age of 7o do not normally apply (§185), but as a public company
can contract out of these provisions, this is unimportant.
"Sec. 48.
' Sec. 181.
oSec.
09 .
"Sec. I30.
"Sec. 129. But see infra.
"Sec.
x9o. But see inira.
"'Itis possible to form a company with a capital of Lsooo for as little as Ca5 (say $65.). Annual
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Limited Partnerships, which were eventually introduced in I907,4 7 did not take root
in .English business life; the need for them had passed. By using the incorporated
private company the liability of all the members can be limited and the members
can play a part in the management without forfeiting this limitation. Limited partnerships, therefore, have been little used, and hardly at all, except in the case of
certain professions where incorporation is forbidden by law or convention.4 s
All these advantages are valuable and the last two are particularly prized. No
trader likes to have to make public the state of his financial affairs, and, even as
regards public companies, it is only as a result of the latest Act that anything approaching full and frank disclosure has been ensured. But since 19o8 the publication
of a balance sheet has, on principle, been required 4 and the Act contains elaborate
provisions designed to ensure that the balance sheet and profit and loss account give
"a true and fair view" of the company's position 50 A private company must, of
course, prepare such accounts, but if it need not reveal them to the outside world
its members will feel much happier. Similarly, the members of the "one-man" or
other small company like to take advantage of the veil of incorporation when it
shields them from liability, but in other respects to continue to regard the business
as "theirs." In particular, they will probably be highly indignant if they cannot
borrow money from the business when it suits them to do so. In so far as a private
company is really just an incorporated partnership, it is perhaps not unreasonable
that it should be privileged in this respect.
Private companies have therefore proved immensely popular and, at the end of
1952, some 26o,80o were on the register with a total paid-up capital of some f2,330
millions. In contrast there were only about ii,6oo public companies, although their
total capital was greater, namely 43,97o million approximately. 5' Not all of these
so-called private companies, however, are in fact fulfilling the economic role for which
the machinery was designed. The statutory definition was based on a recognition
that the legal form of joint stock company could perform two distinct roles; 5 first
that of enabling masses of capital to be put to profitable use by others, and secondly
that of enabling a small private concern to be personified so as to distinguish its
legal rights and liabilities from those of its proprietors. The privileges of private
companies were intended to be conferred only on incorporations for the latter purpose, but in fact public companies performing the former role have made use of
expenses will in practice be little heavier than without incorporation. Winding up is apt to be more
expensive but a formal liquidation may often be avoided by persuading the registrar to strike the company
off the register under §353.
7 EOw. 7, c. 24.
"The registrations of limited partnerships in England total about 2ooo, and of these a considerable
proportion are probably obsolete for the Act contains no provisions for the removal of registrations.
"See, now, §127.
" Sec. 149, 8th Schedule.
I BoARD oF TRAD; COMPANIES ANNUAL REPoRT rox 1952. These are the figures for the whole
of Great Britain, including Scotland.
"SRegistered companies in fact perform yet a third role, that of providing a substitute for the
charitable or "purpose" trust. For this the "company limited by guarantee" is especially suitable but it
is hardly a joint stock company in the true sense.
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private companies for their own purposes. A holding company in which the public
is interested to the fullest extent may operate through subsidiary companies which
can, and normally will, form as private companies since their shares will be wholly
owned by the parent company and no public offer will be made of their securities.
Nevertheless it is obvious that the public are vitally interested in them-albeit at
second-hand-and that there can be no justification for granting them all the immunities intended to be enjoyed only by genuine private concerns.
Hence the latest Act makes a further attempt at a satisfactory definition by subdividing private companies into two classes--"exempt" and others. For this purpose
it proceeds on rather different lines from those followed in 19o8. Whether a company
is a private one or not, depends not on whether it has fewer than 50 members and
does not in fact make an invitation to the public but upon whether its articles limit
the number of members and prohibit invitations.5 3 But whether it has the status
of an exempt private company depends on what in fact has happened to its members,
directors, and securities. And the draftsman tried to lay down conditions which
could be fulfilled, but could only be fulfilled, by a genuinely private concern. This
he found difficult, and the resulting definition takes up a lengthy section 4 and a
whole schedule 5 of the latest Act, and is highly complicated-perhaps unnecessarily
so. But the basic principles are clear enough; the company's shares or debentures
must not be held by a body corporate unless that is itself an exempt private company, its securities must not be held by nominees other than personal representatives
or trustees of a family trust, the number of debenture-holders must not be more
than 50,56 and another company must not be a director of it. These conditions
must be fulfilled as from the date of the commencement of the Act, or from the
original formation of the company if formed later, but the Board of Trade may
allow a company to qualify for the future notwithstanding past breaches of the conditions. If a company qualifies as exempt it continues to enjoy all the advantages of
a private company as outlined above. 7 If it does not, it still enjoys most of these
privileges, since these are regarded as immunities from requirements, essential only
in the case of companies which themselves may make a public issue, but it loses
the rights to withhold its balance sheet and profit and loss account from the public
gaze and to make loans to its directors, ie., it is robbed of the rights which are most
sought after.
As a result, it can hardly be doubted that the legislature has succeeded in restricting the full privileges of a private company to private concerns in the strict
sense. Whether the resulting tripartite classification is necessary or desirable is
more doubtful, and, if it is, it may be that the line has been drawn too strictly and
"' So much so, that originally it did not forfeit its privileges even though the conditions were not in
fact fulfilled, Park v. Royalties Syndicate, Ltd., [1912] 1 K. B. 330. Now by §29 it loses most of the
privileges although it does not actually cease to be a private company.
"' Seventh Schedule.
"' Sec. 129.
" Its shareholders must, of course, already be restricted to 50 if it is to be a private company at all.
" And, indeed, is accorded two others; resolutions requiring filing at the Registry need not be printed
(§43) and its auditor need not possess all the qualifications required in other cases (§x6x).
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in a manner which causes unnecessary confusion. Certainly many genuinely private concerns may now find themselves on the wrong side of the line, while others
may be quite uncertain on which side of it they fall. By failing to ban nominee
shareholdings, 8 but nevertheless making the non-existence of such holdings a condition of exemption, the legislature has placed the management of some companies in
an embarrassing position, for unless all the shares are held by the directors the
latter may be quite unable to tell whether the company is exempt or not. Their
annual returns will be accepted without the accounts if they certify that to the best
of their knowledge and belief the conditions are, and always have been satisfied. 9
But if their belief is wrong, the company was not in law exempt and both it and
the directors may incur liability accordingly. 0 About 73.5 per cent of the private
companies on the register have claimed exemption.0 '
There is, however, one abuse that the latest Act has not prevented; indeed it is
only in the last few years that it has become common practice. As already stated,
on the formation of a private company many of the formalities necessary in the
case of a public company are dispensed with. And under Section 30 a private
company can be converted into a public one by making the necessary alterations to
its articles and by merely filing a prospectus or statement in lieu of prospectus. It
is not necessary for the directors to file consents to act62 or for a Statutory Report
to be made and a Statutory Meeting held," or for a "Trading Certificate" to be
obtained, before the company can commence business.64 Hence it has become the
almost invariable practice initially to form a private company even if it is intended
immediately to convert it into a public one and to make a public issue. This reduces the law to an absurdity. If the requirements in question still fulfill any useful
purpose (which is doubtful) it clearly should not be possible to evade them in this
way; if in fact they are useless anyway, then they should be abolished outright.
Finally, it may be useful to attempt to indicate the principal reasons for the
immense growth of private companies. The obvious reasons are the advantages
which necessarily flow from corporate personality; separation of the property, rights,
and liabilities of the company from those of its members, limited liability, facilitation
of legal proceedings, and perpetual succession. It would, however, be misleading
to suggest that these are today the main inducements leading to the formation of
companies. To a far greater extent the advantages sought are greater facilities for
borrowing and possible reduction of liability to income tax and death duties.
On the face of it, a company with limited liability will be in a weaker position
than a partnership or individual trader in attempting to borrow. In fact, however,
"

See
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6659 (0945), which recommended compulsory disclosure by shareholders of whether they were beneficial
owners or not, but this was rejected as unworkable.
"sSec. x29(I)(b).
"But a prosecution cannot be instituted under §127 except with the consent of the Board of Trade
(§129(3)).
" BOARD OF TRADE: COMPANIES ANNUAL
REPORT FOR 1952.
"Under §z8z.
"3 Under §r30.
"Under §io9.
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this is not so because of the severe restrictions placed by the Bills of Sale Acts, 1878i882,65 and the Bankruptcy Act, 1914,66 on chattel mortgages by unincorporated
concerns. Under the former Acts, a valid security on chattels cannot be granted,
unless possession passes, except by a publicly registered Bill of Sale in the statutory
form. Registration of a Bill of Sale is regarded as calamitous from the point of
view of a trader's credit, and, in any case, the statutory form requires that the
goods be detailed in a schedule, thus effectively preventing a floating charge over
the stock-in-trade in whatever form it happens to be from time to time. Furthermore, on bankruptcy there vest in the trustee in bankruptcy, for the benefit of the
creditors generally, all goods "in the possession order or disposition of the bankrupt,
in his trade or business, by the consent and permission of the true owner, under such
circumstances that he is the reputed owner thereof."' Hence a floating charge over
the stock-in-trade is impracticable. But the provisions in the Bills of Sale Acts relating to mortgages do not apply to registered companies,"" and neither does the
"reputed ownership" clause in the company's liquidation. 9
Hence it is not uncommon for a business, which carries a valuable stock-in-trade
but has no assets which can be specifically mortgaged, to be converted into a private
company solely for the purpose of being able to borrow on debentures conferring
a floating charge. If the personal undertaking of the members is also required they
can, of course, be made to guarantee repayment. Although the debentures must be
publicly registered," ° this has in practice no very serious effect on the company's
credit-presumably because the practice has become so common.
The question of taxation is too large a problem to be more than mentioned here.
All that can be said is that real or imagined taxation advantages have in the last
thirty years been the most common motive of all for incorporation, and that
these thirty years have seen a battle between taxpayers, seeking to take advantage
of the veil of incorporation to evade taxes which would otherwise be payable, and
the Revenue, which has stopped up the gaps in its defenses by tearing the veil aside
until it is now in shreds. As regards taxes on income, the principal advantage of
incorporation is that it may save surtax-the additional impost charged on individuals but not generally on companies. Today, however, savings in this respect,
in the case of companies controlled by fewer than 5 people, are dependent on a "direction" not being made apportioning the undistributed income among the proprietors resulting in the tax being repoverable either from them or from the company itself.' In the case of such companies, too, it is now highly unlikely that
there will be any saving of duties on the deaths of the proprietors, and here again
es4r

& 42 VIcT., c. 31 and 45 & 46 Vscr., c. 43.
4 & 5 Gao. V, c. 59.
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Baukruptcy Act, 1914, §38, 4 & 5 GEo. 5, c. 59.
"' Bills of Sale Act, 1882, §X7.
" Gorringe v. Irwell India Rubber and Gutta Percha Works, 34 Ch. D. x28 (1886).
" Under Part III of the Companies Act, 1948.
"1lncome Tax Act, 1952 (15 & 16 Gao. & I ELIZ. 2, C. 1O) §§245-264, re-enacting provisions dating

from 1922.
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the company itself may be made liable to pay.7 Furthermore, certain additional
duties-Profits Tax and Excess Profits Levy-may now be imposed on companies
although they are not payable by individuals or partnerships. In the light of these
factors, incorporation as a private company may often prove detrimental rather than
beneficial.
There can be little doubt that it is the burden of taxation which is the most
serious problem facing private companies today. During the last century an increasingly large part of the economy of this country has been in the hands of private
companies, and from private companies many of the most important public companies have sprung. The view is now widely held that over-taxation is having a
stultifying effect upon their development and growth, and the National Union of
Manufacturers have recently urged the Chancellor of the Exchequer to set up an
3
impartial committee of inquiry.
If this problem can be solved there is little doubt that private companies will
continue to play an increasingly important role in that (the larger) sector of the
economy which is left to private enterprise. The legal rules afford a remarkably
suitable and readily available framework; indeed, the main criticism of them is that
they may be too easily available and too cheap. Until a hundred years ago incorporation and limited liability were only obtainable at too high a price; now we
seem to have gone to the other extreme. There is one private company on the
register with an authorized capital of Ad divided into two
d shares. Yet this
company is enabled to trade with all the advantages of corporate personalityl It
may well be that there is a case for insisting on a minimum capital to be paid up
in cash."4 This might not be a great protection to the public (for the capital may
be lost), but it would at least mean that promoters would have to pay a reasonable
price for the license to use that potentially dangerous weapon, the limited liability
company. Today it almost seems to have been forgotten that the word "Limited"
was intended as a red danger flag-indeed it is often regarded as an indication of
size and stability. That this should be so is a tribute to the morality of the English
commercial community and indicates the very small extent to which they have
abused the privileges of incorporation. Nevertheless, the possibilities of abuse are
plain and abuses do occur. In this respect freedom may have amounted to license
-and a remarkably cheap license at that.
-Finance Act, 1940 (3 & 4 Gao. 6, c. 29), §§46 et seq. as amended by later Acts.

They supported their plea by a report from the Economist intelligence unit: see the London Times,
Dec. 22, 1952. The Chancellor agreed to review death duty anomalies.
" Or a deposit with the Board of Trade. The COHEN REPORT, op. cit. supra note 58, rejected such
suggestions on the ground that they would discriminate unfairly against persons of small means. This
seems unrealistic. It is precisely people of small means who need protection against loss in the event of
failure of companies with which they have had dealings. One might as well argue that it discriminates
against the poor to refuse to allow firms to carry on the business of insurance without putting up a deposit or to own an automobile without paying premiums on a third party insurance.

